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Abstract and Keywords 
 
 
The decision to remove an aircraft engine for SV is not a deterministic process. 
The decision is taken under conditions ok risk or uncertainty and some subjectivity. In 
this document it is presented a case study using a decision tree to decide the best time to 
remove an engine with high FH since last SV. This case study and the answers from 
engine experts to a questionnaire about the decision process provide information that 
may assist to decide how to optimize engine time on-wing. 
 






A decisão de remover um motor de avião para efectuar manutenção em oficina 
(SV) não é um processo determinístico. A decisão é tomada em condições de risco ou 
incerteza e de certa subjectividade. Neste documento é apresentado o estudo de um 
caso, utilizando-se uma árvore de decisão para escolher a melhor altura para remover 
um motor para SV. Este estudo de caso em conjunto com as respostas dadas por 
especialistas de motores a um questionário sobre o processo de tomada de decisão 
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1.1. The Importance of Engine Maintenance Costs in the Airline Industry 
Competent costs management is a key factor of success in any industry. In the 
airline business it is critical, when taking into consideration its very low profit margins 
and its long standing, unstable and poor economic performance. 
Aircraft maintenance cost, not being the highest direct operating cost of the 
airline activity, is normally the biggest part of the controllable costs by management 
decisions and also the one with the widest range of controllability. 
Engine maintenance is the highest maintenance cost, carrying with it the risk of 
unexpected high expenses in a single event, when an engine has to be removed for a 
shop visit (SV), to perform a repair, a performance restoration or a full overhaul; 
depending on the engine model and design characteristics, thrust power, technical 
condition and workscope definition, an SV may cost from less than 1 million to more 
than 10 million US dollars. 
Engine maintenance cost management has a significant impact on the 
profitability and even survival of airlines, a business that over time has presented an 
intriguing and poor economic performance together with an intrinsic glamour that 
exercises a strong attraction for new investors.  
For decades the airline industry has presented huge global losses, through 
competition, high risk due to uncontrollable external factors and low chance of success, 
as proven by thousands of premature bankruptcies. Despite this discouraging scenario, 
the capital-intensive airline business every year attracts a significant number of 
investors to start-up airlines that join the market, only to fail.  
Characterised by rapid growth in demand and low or negative profitability, the 
airline business presents a paradox (Doganis, 2010, p. 5) – rapid demand growth should 
imply high profits, which does not happen in the airline industry. 
The root cause of this apparent paradox arises from the strong and fast variations 




in an amplified manner, to variations in the macroeconomic climate, represented, for 
example, by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This high susceptibility of the air 
transport industry demand to changes of macroeconomic status causes, in a very short 
period of time, serious gaps between demand and capacity, i.e., large reductions in 
revenue are not compensated quickly enough by reductions in costs.  
To be consistently successful in the airline business requires, at the very least, 
competent costs and revenue management, a flexible organisation with a high degree of 
“escapability of costs” (Doganis, 2010, p. 78), and excellent skills and tools for boosting 
sales and profit in times of macroeconomic decline and, consequently, low air transport 
demand. 
An airline organisation with the characteristics described above and well 
established as an organic system, i.e., with easy and good communication and 
coordination across all the levels of the company, (Stoner, Freeman, & Gilbert, 1995, 
pp. 326-327), has the conditions to adjust its processes and activity quickly enough to 
achieve an adequate balance of capacity and demand and, hopefully, of costs and 
revenues, in order to respond effectively to macroeconomic changes. 
The scheduled airline industry lost US$ 54.1 billion from 2000 until 2008. 
During that period, the total Tonne-Km performed (including passengers, freight and 
mail) increased on average by 4.7% per year, with a minimum growth rate of -3.9% in 
2001 (after September 11) and a maximum growth rate of 12.6% in 2004; in 2009 the 
industry had an estimated loss of US$ 4.1 billion and a growth rate of -4.3%. 
The poor economic performance of the airline business has been always an 
issue. After describing the scheduled airlines’ losses of US$ 2.7 billion in 1990 and US$ 
4 billion in 1991 and the poor profitability of the industry, Shearman (1992, p. 121) 
asked “Is the airline business inherently unprofitable?” The answer was “Certainly not!” 
and this may be accepted as true; however, to obtain success in the airline business, as 
some few exceptional airlines consistently have (e.g. Southwest Airlines in the USA 
and Ryanair in Europe), it is important to identify and fine tune by competent 
management, a certain number of key factors.  One of these is engine maintenance costs 
and expenses, the subject of this document, that may be of interest not only to Power 
Plant Engineers and to Maintenance and Engineering Managers but also to General 




Repair and Overhaul organisations (MROs) and to aircraft and engine manufacturers 
(OEMs – original equipment manufacturers). 
Aircraft engines operate mainly under the maintenance concept “On Condition” 
(OC), which means that, during most of the operating time, it is only mandatory to 
remove an engine from the aircraft if certain operating parameters, degradation 
indicators or physical damages are found to be outside established limits. To be precise, 
removal is also mandatory if, for example, any Life Limited Part (LLP) is at the end of 
its lifetime, so, rigorously speaking, engine is subject to control by all the primary 
maintenance concepts, as described in Chapter 2. 
1.2. When to Remove an Engine from the Aircraft to Perform Maintenance 
From experience, engineering sense and internal criteria specific to each 
organisation, Power Plant Development Engineers responsible for monitoring and 
managing engines’ airworthiness, normally decide to remove engines conservatively 
below any established operating limitation, to avoid the following risks: 
i) Unexpected failure and, consequently, unscheduled removal, incurring: 1) 
additional direct maintenance costs due, for example, to replacing the engine 
outside the base of operations; 2) consequential costs due to flights delays or 
cancellations, aircraft replacement, meals, hotel accommodation and 
compensation to passengers; 3) intangible costs such as damage to airline 
reputation. 
ii) Excessive degradation that may significantly increase the cost of the engine 
repair and performance restoration. 
iii) Uncontrolled internal failure causing additional severe and expensive damage to 
the engine. 
iv) High increase in fuel consumption as a result of performance degradation. 
Ideally engine maintenance should be managed in order to achieve the minimum 
maintenance unit cost, in full compliance with safety requirements. 
The cost of engine maintenance in a small airline (let us say with six to eight 
aircraft) would be about 40% of the total maintenance cost, which may represent 




charter airline: this percentage depends heavily on the fuel price. Assuming that the 
total maintenance cost is 15% of the total operating cost, the engine maintenance cost 
would therefore represent 6% of the total operating cost.  Under the assumption that 
engine maintenance cost has a controllability range of 30%, then good management 
may represent a contribution to profit of about 1.8%, a significant figure for an industry 
where a 3 to 4% profit margin is celebrated as good and rare. 
Besides the inherent reliability and maintainability of the engine model, 
achieved by the initial design and subsequent improvements, engine maintenance cost 
depends on a certain number of factors, including: 
- average stage length of each flight; 
- percentage of engine derating (reduction of the maximum engine power) at take-
off and climbing; 
- good maintenance practices; 
- definition of the shop visit (SV) workscope, including service bulletins’ 
incorporation policy; 
- selection of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) organisation and contract 
negotiation skills; 
- adequate decisions about the time to remove an engine from the aircraft and 
send it for an SV, the subject of this document. 
This project will assess the criteria used or recommended by airlines, MRO 
organisations and OEMs, to decide when to remove an engine for a SV, and the impact 
of this decision on the engine maintenance unit cost, which means the engine 
maintenance cost per hour flown. 
Also assessed will be past decisions on the time to remove engines from aircraft, 
through the review of engine SV reports and damage findings, to evaluate what would 
be the unit maintenance cost of the engine if the engine had been removed several 
flights sooner or later than the actual time. 
1.3. The Aim and Objectives of this Project 
Practical constrains will limit the number of organisations that will provide 




may not be disclosed by airlines or other corporations. Taking into account some 
limitations of the research methodology, such as no random sample of the companies 
selected for the questionnaire used here, the conclusions from the practices reported 
here shall not be generalised or assumed as best practice at this stage. 
The recommendations on the rules and model to decide when to remove an 
engine to achieve a minimum unit cost may be a satisfactory tool for certain airlines but 
not for others, depending on individual characteristics and conditions such as fleet size, 
aircraft owned or under operating leases, internal maintenance capability, type of 
subcontracts for engine maintenance, engine age, type of aircraft operation, commercial 
services of the airline, etc. 
It is also important to mention that in certain financial or contractual situations, 
airlines may decide to sacrifice engine maintenance unit cost in favour of minimising 
cash out in a specific period – removing an engine sooner or later than ideal or reducing 
the recommended workscope of the SV are examples of decisions to reduce expense at 
a certain time, even if in the long term the unit cost will be higher. 
Kennet (1994) developed a plausible econometric structural model of aircraft 
engine maintenance and estimated the structural parameters, per engine type, separately 
for the airline regulated and deregulated eras. The validity of separating the sample of 
engine data was proved by likelihood ratio tests, confirming earlier studies that there 
were different engine maintenance behaviours, before and after deregulation.  The 
results of the data analysis seem to indicate that airlines took action to optimise the 
scheduling of engine SVs, by keeping the engines longer on the wing after the 
deregulation of the airline business, which increased the competition in the industry. 
The aim of this project is to define a methodology to establish the best time to 
remove an engine for a SV, in order to achieve the minimum maintenance unit cost, 
taking into account the reliability of the specific engine model, the trends of the engine 
monitoring parameters (such as exhaust gas turbine temperature (EGT), engine rotation 
speeds, fuel consumption, vibration in rotors, oil pressure), the physical status of the 
engine as determined by oil consumption, and visual and borescope inspections. 
To achieve the aim of this work, the following objectives will be undertaken:  
a) To investigate, by using questionnaires, what are the criteria, recommendations 




for a SV, and if and how they look for the minimum engine maintenance unit 
cost. 
b) To evaluate a small number of past engine histories of SVs, using open, deep 
and detailed qualitative analysis (Patton, 1990, p. 14) to obtain an adequate 
understanding of: 
i) Reasons for the engine removal; 
ii) Damage findings in the SV and related causes; 
iii) Engine deterioration process and characteristics of damage propagation;  
Assessment of the decision on the timing to remove an engine, taking into 
consideration minimum cost and the risk and consequential costs of unexpected failure 
and unscheduled engine removal; 
iv) Conclusions on best practices and criteria that could improve the past 
decisions of the time to remove an engine for a SV. 
c) To define a set of rules and outline a statistical model to assist in deciding the 
best or a satisfactory time to remove an engine for a SV, aiming to minimise 
engine maintenance unit cost, which may provide a significant contribution to 
airline profit. 
The object of engine manufacturers is to achieve, by design and production, high 
inherent reliability and maintainability, so that the engine should be able to stay in the 
wing as long as possible and be economically affordable. 
One hypothesis to verify within this project is a common belief that maintenance 
unit cost always decreases if the engine stays in the wing as long as possible, within the 
limitations defined by manufacturers and civil aviation authorities and weighting the 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Primary Aircraft Maintenance Concepts 
The aviation authorities, and in particular the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), 
recognise three primary aircraft, component and engine (component or item) 
maintenance processes: 
- Hard Time (HT) – certain tasks are mandatorily performed at fixed intervals; 
- On Condition (OC) – the equipment, component or engine is checked periodically for 
its condition by means of inspections and/or the regular collection of data indicating its 
state or condition, being removed when one engine parameter exceeds certain 
established limits or when compared to trend patterns it shows a reduction of reliability 
and imminent failure; 
- Condition Monitoring (CM) – the process of monitoring the airworthiness of the 
aircraft fleet and its maintenance performance; this process allows for the failure of the 
component and consists of collecting and analysing ex post facto (after the fact) data on 
the entire population of a component, using a reliability or performance evaluation 
programme to assess the behaviour of the unit and take corrective action to modify the 
equipment or maintenance programme, if and when necessary (BOEING, 1982, pp. 01-
07). 
HT and OC are a priori individual monitoring processes aimed at removing the 
component or unit before it fails, i.e., they are preventive maintenance processes. CM is 
not intended to prevent a failure, but to assess ex post facto the population behaviour. 
A comprehensive CM/Reliability programme overlaps the three primary 
maintenance control processes, acting as a cover under which those processes are 
performed. It is a secondary maintenance control process used to assess the 
effectiveness of primary processes, the suitability of the HT and OC intervals, and may 
require modifications to the initial project, changing the primary control process or the 
time limits for removal or inspection (BOEING, 1982, pp. 01-07).  The CM/Reliability 




complaints, on-board aircraft equipment records, inspections and maintenance tests, 
shop findings and other data from aircraft operations for statistical analysis and 
technical evaluation in order to assess the performance and overall effectiveness of the 
maintenance programme and take corrective action (BOEING, 1982, pp. 01-09). 
Aviation authorities require airlines to have CM/Reliability programmes to 
monitor their aircraft fleets, and in particular: 
a) The FAA (Federal Aviation Authority)/USA, in the Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR) Part 121.373, requires: 
Continuing analysis and surveillance. 
(a) Each certificate holder shall establish and maintain a system for the continuing analysis and surveillance 
of the performance and effectiveness of its inspection program and the program covering other maintenance, 
preventive maintenance, and alterations and for the correction of any deficiency in those programs, 
regardless of whether those programs are carried out by the certificate holder or by another person.” (FAA, 
1996, Sec 121.373). 
b) The EASA (European Air Safety Agency), the regulating and supervisory 
authority for the EU and member countries, has established that: 
(d) The maintenance programme shall contain details, including frequency, of all maintenance to be carried 
out, including any specific tasks linked to specific operations. The programme must include a reliability 
programme when the maintenance programme is based: 
1. on Maintenance Steering Group logic, or; 
2. mainly on condition monitoring. (EASA, 2003, Part M M.A. 302). 
In general, engines are subject to a consistent lato sensu On Condition 
programme or to be more precise, a Condition-Based Maintenance philosophy, that 
includes the designated Engine Condition Monitoring (ECM) or Engine Health 
Monitoring (EHM) programme, which constantly monitors the condition of a number of 
engine operating parameters (turbine gas temperature, speed of rotors, vibrations, oil 
pressure, etc.) to ensure engine removal before in-service failure. 
Under the condition-based maintenance concept, gas turbine engines are in fact 
subject to control by the three primary maintenance processes, i.e. HT, OC and CM. 
GE/CFMI (2009) considers that those processes work hand in hand with one another 
and that they carry equal weight in a maintenance program. Most of time the engine 
removal time is dictated by the OC concept, but all three processes are equally 





In the Table 1 below is presented the use of the three primary maintenance 






Action Engine Examples 
Hard Time (HT) 
 
Preventive Hour, Cycle or 
Calendar 
Limits 
 Remove for 
SV:  
























 other line 
maintenance 
items; or 
 Remove engine 
for SV 




 EGT margin 










causes of trend 
shifts 





 Trend shift in 
Take-off EGT 
 Take-off EGT 
margin 
 Cruise Low 
Pressure rotor 
 Reliability data 
from OEM and 
operator 
Table 1 -  Engine primary maintenance processes 
 
2.2. About Reliability and Bayesian Statistics 
Kinnison (2004) considers two main approaches to the reliability concept in the 
airline industry: one is the overall airline dispatch reliability (and in particular the 
maintenance department dispatch reliability), represented by the percentage of on-time 
departures of scheduled flights; the other is concerned with the effectiveness of the 




departure delays. This second approach is more effective and complete for maintenance 
purposes and has a strong correlation with maintenance and engineering dispatch 
reliability and, consequently, with the overall airline dispatch reliability. 
Reliability can be defined as “the probability of a given system performing its 
function satisfactorily over a certain period of time and under specified operating 
conditions.” (Kapur & Lamberson, 2006, p. 13.2).   
Reliability is a measure of the quality of a product and can have different 
meanings, depending on the characteristics of the product, its use and the viability or 
ability to be repaired after damage.   
A method of determining reliability is through life testing whereby a batch of 
components or units is tested over an extended period of time and the failure times 
recorded. The test can be done either by i) Non-replacement, when an item fails it is not 
replaced and the test ends at a specified time (time-truncated) or at specified number of 
failures (sample-truncated); ii) Replacement, when an item fails it is replaced and the 
test continues indefinitely or stops by a specified rule; Sequential, in which the test is 
stopped when the batches being tested either achieve or fail to achieve the specified 
goal (Chatfield, 1983, pp. 319-320). 
When life testing the reliability of a product or component, one of the important 
aspects to consider is censoring – the life testing data are censored when the failure time 
of a certain component is not precisely known, due either to the characteristics of the 
test, or to the test being interrupted, whether deliberately or not, or to fortuitous or other 
circumstances (Hamada, Wilson, Reese, & Martz, 2008, pp. 13-14). 
In analytical terms, where T, the time to failure, is a random variable, reliability 
R (t) is defined as: 
R (t) = Probability P (T> t) = ∫  ( )  
 
 




Where:  ( )   is the probability density function (representing the probability of 
instantaneous failure) and F(t) = ∫  ( )  
 
 
 the cumulative distribution function 
(representing the probability of failure from time zero to time t). 
Some of the indirect measures of reliability include: 
a) Mean Time to Failure = MTTF = ∫   ( )  
 
  
, a performance indicator 




this method only takes into account the average life of the units that failed, as 
per Hamada et al. (2008, p. 8) and BOEING (1982, pp. 5-3). 
b) Mean Time Between Failures 
MTBF = 
                               (                 )              
                                            
, 
takes into account the hours operated by the unit (all units) in any given 
period, but only divides by the number of failures of the units that did fail. 
c) Mean Time Between Removals 
MTBR = 
                                (                 )              
                                                                          
 
d) Failure rate or hazard function, 
Hazard Function = h(t) = 
 ( )
 ( )
, this is the conditional probability of 
instantaneous failure (i.e. in the interval t+dt), since there have not been any 
failures or the units have survived to time t. 
Wu, Liu, Ding and Liu (2004) stress that “reliability and maintainability” are 
inherent properties of an aircraft (and engine) and they estimate that 70 to 85% of its 
lifetime cost is determined at the design stage. The authors refer to the “intrinsic 
reliability” or “ex works” that is conditioned by the characteristics and quality of the 
project (Assis, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the maximum limits of reliability, and operational and 
economic performance established by the quality of the aircraft’s or engine’s project, it 
is obvious that good maintenance practices, good techniques for detecting anomalies, 
good condition monitoring, modifications for product improvement, associated with 
competent economic management, tend to maximise the availability of the equipment 
and minimise maintenance costs. 
The reliability methodology based on Bayesian statistics appears to fit the needs 
of modelling and simulation to evaluate the decision of when to remove an engine from 
an aircraft and send it for a SV, which is the subject of this study. 
The open, comprehensive and detailed qualitative analysis of historical data, 





Assuming a mixing method of research, qualitative and quantitative data sets 
may be merged, connected or embedded to produce results (Plano Clark & Creswell, 
2007). 
Bayesian statistics are based on Bayes theorem: 
 (  ∣  )   
 ( ∣   ) (  )
 ( )
  
 ( ∣   ) (  )
∑ ( (  ∣   ) (  ) 
 
 
Where Ai is a partition A = {A1,   A2 ... An) of the sample space considered, B is 
any event in the sample space, where P (Ai) > 0 and Ai∩Aj = Ø. 
The Bayesian method of reliability in conjunction with current computing 
power, enables flexibility for modelling and simulating situations in which, in addition 
to a priori knowledge, empirical results can be added to the mathematical model. 
The model incorporates the concept of subjective probability or degree of 
credibility. Based on the above formula, an initial subjective probability (based on 
current knowledge), i.e. a certain degree of credibility, can be assigned to the input data 
or initial conjecture Ai, considered as “antecedents”, “hypotheses” or “states”. 
Subsequently, from the data gleaned from empirical research – analysis of historical 
data, operational occurrences, past experience, tests, observations – the a priori 
probabilities are modified, changing from P(Ai) to  (  ∣  ), thus incorporating 
information from past experience represented by the data B (Paulino, Turkman, & 
Murteira, 2003). 
As per Hamada al. (2008, pp. 27-36), overall Bayes’ Theorem and for 
continuous distributions, is represented by 
 ( | )  
 ( | ) ( )
∫  ( | ) ( )  
 
Where  ( | ) is the a posteriori distribution function,  ( ) the a priori 
distribution function,  ( | ) the distribution function of the sample data of experience 
and  ( | ) ( )   the marginal distribution (unconditioned) of data. 
Having determined the a posteriori function, it is possible to define a predictive 
distribution, to project future or simulation values by integrating the sampling 




2.3. An Overview of the Jet Engine 
The focus of this project is on the jet engine, the main method of propulsion of 
modern aircraft. 
The first jet propulsion engine was patented by French engineer René Lorin in 
1913; it was an athodyd engine, i.e. an aero-thermodynamic-duct, with no major 
rotating parts. This device, similar to what is now called the ram jet, was impossible to 
manufacture with the existing technology at that time (Rolls Royce Limited, 1973).  In 
1930, Frank Whittle patented a gas turbine to produce a propulsive jet, that 11 years 
later performed its maiden flight, providing the basis for propulsion of modern aircraft 
(Rolls Royce Limited, 1973). 
There are several types of jet engine: ram jet, pulse jet, turbo ram jet, rocket, 
turbo-rocket and gas turbine. Modern commercial transport airplanes are equipped with 
turbo-propeller, turbojet and turbofan engines. Turbo jet engines are being replaced by 
the turbofan engine (Figure 1) which has the following characteristics:  
i) Most of the engine inlet air, accelerated by the fan, does not go into the rest of 
the engine, i.e. the compressors, combustion chamber and turbines; 
ii) A significant portion of the thrust is produced by the fan, a device with a 
working principle similar to a propeller; 
iii) Due to the characteristics above, the turbo fan engine (especially the high by-





Figure 1 - Turbo fan engine CFM56 (source CFMI) 
Using as an example a twin-spool (two shafts) turbo fan engine, the main 
modules of the CFM56 engine are as follows (Figure 2): 
- Fan Module, comprising: 
o Fan 
o Booster or Low Pressure Compressor (LPC), where the inlet air from the 
fan is firstly compressed. 
- High Pressure Compressor (HPC), where the air from the LPC suffers additional 
compression. 
- Core Engine Module, comprising: 
Combustor Chamber (CC), that receives high pressure air and fuel that are 
ignited by the igniters, resulting in very hot gas, which expands in the turbines and 
delivers the energy that makes the turbines spin and drive the fan and compressors; 
o High Pressure Turbine (HPT), which receives the very hot gas from the 
CC and drives the HPC. 
Low Pressure Turbine (LPT), which receives hot gas from the HPT and drives 
the LPC and the fan; the gas from the LPT leaves the engine from the exhaust assembly, 




- Accessory Drive Module driven by the LPC, which drives: 
o several components that provide control and resources, such as fuel and 
oil, to the engine – for example fuel pump, fuel control unit and oil 
pump; 
o components that provide electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic power to 
several systems of the airplane – such as lights, navigation, landing gear 
and air conditioning. 
o  
o  
Figure 2 - Modules of the CFM 56 turbo fan engine (source CFMI) 
Figure 3 below shows the two rotating systems of a twin spool engine: i) one 
shaft rotating at N1 speed with the LPT, LPC and Fan; ii) the other shaft rotating at N2 
speed, with HPC and HPT. 
Figure 4 illustrates the path of the air and the hot gas from the combustor 





Figure 3 - The two rotating systems in a twin spool engine (source CFMI) 
 




2.4. Specific Academic literature Review on Engine Reliability and Costs 
2.4.1. How relevant is the issue of optimising engine time on the wing? 
When an aircraft becomes old or obsolete, because its technological and, 
concomitantly, its economic performance decays, the last remaining value stays with the 
engines; everything else is just like a can to be sold for the value of the weight of 
recyclable material. When airlines decide to discontinue the operation of one obsolete 
aircraft, engines may be sold to be used in other aircraft (likely to be obsolete also), as a 
less expensive alternative to the repair of replacement engines, or to be used for land 
power plants. 
Kang, Ogaji, Pilidis and Kong (2008) consider that three components of aircraft 
Direct Operating Cost (DOC) can be directly attributed to engine performance, design 
and reliability: the cost of fuel, engine acquisition and engine maintenance. The authors 
state that for a typical wide body aircraft, those costs would be more than 40% of the 
DOC of the aircraft, split as follows: 55% for fuel, 30% for engine maintenance and 
15% for engine acquisition. 
The figures above represent a perspective in a certain calendar time and cannot 
be taken as an absolute truth. However, they provide a valid illustration of the 
importance of engines within aircraft operating cost. Actually a proportion of the cost 
depends on fuel price (i.e. crude oil price) and fuel consumption, and related cost 
depends not only on engine performance but is also highly dependent on the 
aerodynamic characteristics and structural efficiency of the aircraft. 
The percentage of any cost component of the airline’s DOC depends 
significantly on the unit cost of fuel, meaning on the cost of a barrel of crude oil, which 
in recent decades has presented high variations. When the fuel price increases, the 
percentage of the other costs components on DOC decreases, and vice versa. 
Modern aircraft are now built with more fibre reinforced plastics (composite 
materials) to reduce weight, advanced aerodynamic features (such as winglets/Boeing 
and sharklets/Airbus on the wing tips) to reduce drag, and in flight fuel transfer between 
tanks to optimise the aircraft’s centre of gravity and reduce drag.  All these 
characteristics, together with engine performance, are relevant for aircraft fuel 




Despite the above considerations, the engine related costs are very important in 
the airline activity. 
Putting aside fuel consumption and other engine ownership costs that depend 
essentially on external factors with little controllability by the airline, engine 
maintenance cost is one of the most important parts of controllable DOC by 
management decision and has two main components: 
a) On aircraft – includes inspection, servicing and defect correction tasks 
performed during line maintenance (between flights) and base maintenance 
(during periodic inspections) of the aircraft; 
b) Off aircraft or SVs – extensive and time consuming work that may be an engine 
repair, a performance restoration or an overhaul, all of which are performed in 
engine shops. 
As indicative figures, an aircraft manufacturer (Airbus S.A.S, n.d.) considers 
that On Aircraft (Line) Maintenance is 5% of ownership costs (10% of engine direct 
maintenance cost), and SVs account for 40% of ownership costs (80% of engine direct 
maintenance cost). In general engine ownership costs can be split as follows:  
i) Acquisition 35%; 
ii) Spares acquisition 15%;  
iii) Shop Visits 30%;  
iv) Life Limited Parts (Shop Visit) 10%;  
v) Line (and base maintenance) 5%;  
vi) Support 5%). 
Actual proportions of On Aircraft and Off Aircraft vary significantly with engine 
models and airlines, but Off Aircraft (SV) maintenance is always much more expensive 
than On Aircraft maintenance. 
Another important difference is that engine On Aircraft maintenance expenses 
occur almost uniformly along time and shop maintenance occurs in periods of about two 
to five years per operating engine, with expenses, for a wide body aircraft, that may 
vary from US$1 to 10 million; for example for a Boeing 767-300 aircraft, the cost of an 
SV is in the range of $2 to $3.5 million; for a Trent engine installed in a Boeing 777 it 




Kang et al. (2008) consider that an engine SV (unit) cost depends on Shop Visit 
Rate (SVR), i.e. the number of SVs per 1,000 engine flight hours (EFHs), the 
workscope of each SV pattern (the sequence of different workscopes) and the man 
hours and material spent in each SV. Despite the fact that manufacturers design engines 
to achieve a low SVR (i.e. long time on the wing) engine maintenance unit cost is not 
always a monotone function in relation to SVR or engine time on the wing. 
The engine SV maintenance unit cost is the cost of the engine SVs divided by 
the engine flight hours operated by the engine between SVs. 
Due to wear and material degradation, the total cost of an SV increases with 
increasing engine time on the wing. This is an obvious fact, therefore it is not possible 
to assume a priori that engine maintenance unit cost (engine maintenance cost per flight 
hour) will always decrease when engine time on the wing increases (i.e. when SVR 
decreases). 
To decide when to remove an engine for an SV is not a deterministic problem.  
Since engines are maintained essentially under the concept “On Condition” and aircraft 
operators manage the engine to avoid the risk of unscheduled removal, the decision to 
remove the engine is done conservatively before engine condition monitoring 
parameters achieve allowed limits. 
Engine time on the wing is not necessarily the most important factor in engine 
maintenance cost, but when an engine is installed on an aircraft, time on the wing is 
quasi the only factor that management may use to control engine maintenance cost, 
assuming that the airline is following the required and approved maintenance and 
operational practices. 
Empirical research work done by Kennet (1993) and (1994) presented evidence, 
using two different methodologies, that after the airline business deregulation in the 
USA, airline managers changed maintenance behaviour towards optimising engine time 
on the wing to reduce costs in order to face the climate of stiff increased competition. 
We may conclude that optimising engine time on the wing is relevant in 
managing airlines because it has a strong influence on maintenance costs, an important 
part of controllable DOC, by preventing over maintenance, provided there is an 




of the critical components and the reliability of the engine is taken into consideration to 
avoid the risk of in-service failure. 
2.4.2. Methodologies regarding engine reliability and shop visit 
scheduling. 
The design of engine components in the classical approach has been 
deterministic; in this method equations representing material and fluid characteristics 
establish the operating conditions of engine components, then by applying safety factors 
dictated by experience, the components’ performance, life and reliability are determined 
(Zaretsky & Hendriks, 2002). 
In actual conditions, there is significant variability in material, manufacturer 
processes and operating conditions that may not be adequately represented in the 
deterministic functions referred to above, resulting in high variances and very 
conservative safety factors. 
Instead of using deterministic equations, it is valuable to use a probabilistic or 
stochastic approach that may assist to design for manufacturers and operational 
variations in accordance with an accepted or established risk. 
Zaretsky & Hendriks (2002) used Weibull probability analysis to predict engine 
life and reliability, based on the linear damage rule (Palmgren-Langer-Miner). 
 




   
 
  
    
 
  
   
Where: 
    engine system life (all components) 
  , ...,   cumulative life of each component 
e engine system Weibull distribution slope or Weibull module 
e1, ...,e2 Weibull slope of each engine component. 
The method of Zaretsky & Hendriks (2002), applied with adequate statistical 
data from past operations, can be used by design engineers to predict the reliability of 
new engines; it can also be used by airlines to predict the life and reliability of their 
engines. 
Wang & Jin (2010) presented an approach based on Weibull failure distribution 
to determine the optimal replacement times for turbine wheels, taking into account a 




approach is considered to be adequate to determine the optimal replacement time, since 
significant uncertainty is assumed to exist in the turbine cumulative operating hours. 
This is a rare situation in a regulated airline environment, but the concept appears to 
have possible extensions to other operational characteristics, including at least the 
variations in manufacturer processes, maintenance programmes and procedures, average 
stage length and past engine workscopes. 
MRO companies may provide engine maintenance services under two types of 
contract: time and material, or by flight hour. In the former, the customer is charged a 
posteriori an amount that includes cost of labour, material, life limited parts (LLPs) and 
subcontracted work spent in the engine SV. In contrast, in the latter, the customer is 
charged a priori an agreed fixed value by engine flight hour which depends on the 
engine’s average flight length, i.e. the average flight hours (engine operating hours) per 
cycle or landing; that charge per flight hour increases when the average flight or stage 
length decreases, since thermal stress and other loads are higher when the engine is 
operating in a take-off (maximum power) regime. 
Today, engine manufacturers have their own engine MROs to provide engine 
shop maintenance services to airlines and to other customers. The main engine 
manufacturers for airlines are General Electric, Rolls Royce, Pratt &Whitney, CFM, 
IAE and SNECMA. 
Engine MROs operate in a very competitive arena and deal with a complex 
number of interrelated entities and parameters: i) airlines, MROs bases in different 
locations, material suppliers, logistics providers; ii) aircraft installed engines, spare 
engines; iii) flight hours, flight cycles, ECM parameters, borescope inspections, 
airworthiness directives (ADs); iv) commercial planning and operation, scheduled 
maintenance events, engine incidents; v) others. 
In order to become competitive some engine MROs use computer applications 
for the prediction and scheduling of an engine SV. 
It is a key requirement that engine MROs possess an effective tool for 
prediction, scheduling and to assist in deciding when to remove an engine for an SV in 
order to: i) plan shop maintenance slots; ii) optimise materials provisioning; iii) avoid 
aircraft on ground (AOG) due to lack of engine replacement; iv) ensure adequate 




wing within an adequate trade-off with risk of in-service failure and consequential 
losses. 
The last requirement (optimising time on the wing) is more important for the 
MRO when providing services under a contract with a fixed price by flight hour, since 
bad engine condition monitoring or a bad decision on timing to remove an engine for an 
SV would result in higher costs to be absorbed by the MRO during the long term life of 
this type of contract – 5, 10 or more years. 
Higher than desirable maintenance costs may arise from: 
i) engine removed before optimal time, resulting in over maintenance and 
consequently increased direct maintenance costs and finance costs; 
ii) engine removed after time of optimal removal, with increased cost of labour 
and material in the SV, not compensated for by increased time on the wing; 
iii) in-service engine failure (on the ground or in flight) that may implicate 
additional damage to the engine caused by internal failure of a component, 
logistics costs of engine replacement in an unplanned location, and 
commercial costs of passengers, cargo and reputation. 
Stranjak et al. (2008) describe an agent-based simulation tool called “Overhaul 
Prediction and Scheduling” (OPS) to deal with the complexities faced by engine MROs 
to manage engine fleets. The project was developed in collaboration with the engine 
manufacturer and MRO Rolls-Royce.  In the application of OPS, the stakeholders of the 
MRO (or Aero Repair and Overhaul – AR&O) are modelled as autonomous agents who 
negotiate to decide the best date to remove an engine to send it for an SV, taking into 
account the best compromise of cost, in-service failure risk and revenue. 
The OPS agents are: 
i) Fleet Manager – responsible for recording engine flight hours, cycles, ECM 
parameters and engine physical status; 
ii) Fleet Planner (FP) – determines engine SV schedules; 
iii) Overhaul Base (OHB) – responsible for capacity management of the MRO’s 
engine overhaul base. 
The FP Agent aims to keep the engine on the wing as long as possible, but not 




algorithm that minimises costs, the FP Agent decides the priorities for scheduling 
engines for an SV, negotiating capacity with the OHB agent. 
In the OPS application, engine removal must occur before the whole engine 
reliability is below an acceptable limit, which will be determined by the combination of 
failure risks of the engine components represented by the Weibull function with specific 
scale and shape parameters for each component. 
In conclusion, academic work and sophisticated industry applications deal with 
the problems of prediction and scheduling time for engine SVs, using in many cases the 
Weibull distribution for reliability calculations and artificial intelligence algorithms.  
Taking into account the complexities of engine removal prediction and SV scheduling, 
the use of reliability methods, adequate algorithms and artificial intelligence approaches 
may provide fundamental assistance to engine managers to optimise the engine time on 





Chapter 3  
3.  METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGY 
3.1. Methodology General Approach 
To do an appraisal of the present procedures and to outline a methodology that 
objectively defines the best time to remove an engine and send it for a SV, aiming at the 
lowest maintenance cost per hour of operation, the working plan described below was 
adopted: 
a) Literature review on engine reliability, maintainability, costs and other fields 
relevant for the project, including primary sources such as refereed journals, 
conference proceedings and research theses; secondary literature sources were 
also reviewed, such as text books, professional and trade journals, technical 
documentation from airlines, aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, 
MROs and consultants. 
b) Distribute questionnaires and conduct semi-structured interviews with engine 
experts from domestic and foreign aviation companies in order to collect and 
systematise information about the practices regarding engine reliability, removal 
decision, prediction and SV scheduling; 
c) Collect qualitative (engine damage findings, behaviour and causes) and 
quantitative (operating hours and cycles, reliability and costs) information from 
airlines, manufacturers and engine repair and overhaul organisations (MROs) 
through surveys and visits; 
d) Perform qualitative analysis and interpretation and quantitative evaluations. 
Thus, the strategy to be adopted is essentially mixed.  
Using qualitative methods to collect, select and analyse data – on a holistic basis 
of inductive, systemic and detailed analysis – a relatively small but information-rich 





Qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analysed, providing a better 
understanding of the subject under analysis; in the adopted methodology, during the 
appraisal process, it is intended that the two types of data will be merged, connected or 
embedded, to enhance results and conclusions (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Some data 
collected will be subject to statistical analysis and other quantitative methods to assist 
the decision process to remove an engine for an SV, with the aim at obtaining minimum 
engine maintenance unit cost. 
It appears that the use of statistical and Bayesian reliability methods suits 
modelling objectives in deciding when to remove an engine for an SV. The use of this 
statistical approach may be particularly interesting, as an alternative to the classical 
frequentist statistical methods, in the case of small airlines where the sample space is 
small. 
Bayesian reliability methods, due to the ease with which information beyond the 
information contained in experimental data can be included in the models, such as 
theories relevant to the study, the results of engineering tests, past experience with 
similar entities, generic reliability data and, particularly important in the case at hand, 
engineering sense (Hamada et al., 2008), may all be appropriate tools for data 
processing to determine, with adequate probability and reliability, the best time to 
remove the engine to obtain the minimum unit cost. 
The potential for using Bayesian reliability in the field of engine SV prediction 
for minimum costs will be appraised in this study. 
3.2. Application of the Methodology 
To obtain data to achieve the objectives of this project, an operational plan was 
elaborated and followed, and is described in this section. 
On-line Questionnaire 
An on-line questionnaire (Appendix I) was prepared and sent, by convenience 
sample method (Hill & Hill, 2008), to engine experts or relevant staff of airlines, 
MROs, and engine and aircraft manufacturers – relevant people, in this context, are 
those who participate or have participated in the decision process to remove an engine 




The objective was to obtain empirical data on the decision process to remove an 
engine for an SV, while still operating within manufacturer limits, by providing answers 
to the following questions: 
i) Who decides? 
ii) What departments participate in the decision process? 
iii) What is the importance of engine maintenance unit cost in the decision process? 
iv) What are the objective factors in the decision process? 
v) How do objective factors change with the type of ownership of the aircraft? 
vi) How do objective factors change with the kind of contract with the MRO? 
vii) What are the criteria used to decide the time to remove an engine for an SV? 
viii) What is the model or formal procedures used to decide when to remove an 
engine for an SV? 
ix) How do the objective factors, criteria and decision procedures change with the 
size of airlines? 
The questionnaire is divided into three parts: the first to characterise the 
organisation by size and number of aircraft, the second to ensure that the answers come 
from experts/relevant people for the project, and the third includes the questions to 
obtain the required data. 
Evaluation of the documentation of past engine SVs 
To obtain information about hours and cycles of operation until removal, causes 
for removal, damage findings during SVs, causes of damages. 
Case Study – A formal process to decide the time to remove an engine for a shop 
visit 
In this study it is described how the time to remove an engine for a SV was 
decided, in order to achieve the minimum engine maintenance cost per flight hour (FH), 
but taking into account the engine reliability to avoid the risk of failure and unscheduled 
removal. The decision was critical for the following reasons: 
x) The engine had accumulated about 15,000 FH and 3000 cycles (landings) since 
the last SV, so it was operating at the highest limits of its reliability; 
i) The engine condition monitoring (ECM) parameters were showing significant 
degradation and  the take-off EGT margin in relation to allowable limits was 




ii) If the engine were not removed soon, then the next suitable opportunity would 
be five months later, since the aircraft where the engine was installed had been 
wet leased in ACMI (Aircraft with Crew, Maintenance and Insurance) to another 
airline, to operate a very intense flight programme based in a foreign airport; 
iii) Since the planned commercial operation was very intense, an engine failure and 
its unscheduled removal would cause serious damage to the flight programme, 
very high costs to replace the engine, loss of revenue and serious complaints 
from the customer airline. 
Also in this study the decision taken is assessed, based on the actual facts that 
did occur in the following six months after the decision, including engine operation, 
removal, disassembly and inspection during the SV and estimates of  the differential 
costs related to the option that was adopted. 
In April 2011, the engineering department of one airline was requesting an 
approval to remove a PW4060 engine from an aircraft to send it for an SV. The 
approval from top management was mainly related to commercial and financial aspects: 
i) when would be the best time to remove the engine in order to minimise commercial 
impact and loss of revenue (opportunity costs); ii) the selection of the MRO and the 
associated cost to remove the engine for an SV; iii) the solution of the provider of a 
replacement engine on loan; iv) the engine MRO and the contractual conditions of the 
SV. 
Regarding the above aspects, the most important economic and financial issue is 
the engine SV, which in this case would cost between $3 and $4 million. The engine 
loan, for a period of 70 to 90 days, would cost: i) between $2,000 and $3,000 as daily 
rent; ii) between $250 and $350 per Engine Flight Hour (EFH) and between $250 and 
$350 per engine flight cycle (or aircraft landing). 
The reason for the engineering department to request the engine replacement 
was based on its technical status and pilots’ reports: 
i) The figures of the Engine Condition Monitoring (ECM) parameters were 
showing a reduction on margins towards the limits; 
ii) Last borescope inspection of the engine core detected some significant defects in 




procedures i.e., periodic borescope inspection to be sure damage would not 
increase to dimensions and location that would exceed allowed limits. 
iii) Pilots were reporting engine slow starting and instrument indications of 
relatively high engine temperature, fuel flow, rotation and vibration when 
compared with the other engine installed in the same aircraft; in addition, the 
fuel consumption difference was causing weight imbalance in the wing tanks so 
the pilots had to do fuel transfers in flight, although this is a common practice. 
In the operational scenario described above, the common decision, without any 
cost evaluation, is to remove the engine and send it for an SV. In the present case, the 
airline decided to perform a systematic evaluation on the timing to remove the engine, 
as presented below. 
The decision process includes: 
i) Review of the engine status, including the workscope of the last SV; 
ii) Technical assessment of the overall condition of the engine, including the ECM 
parameters; 
iii) Technical assessment of the defects found during borescope inspections; 
iv) Safety evaluation of the risk of the engine in-service failure and its 
consequences; 
v) Evaluation of the economic impact of the risk of engine failure during the 
planned ACMI operation; 
vi) Provided the safety risk is assessed as remote and concurrently the probability of 
in-service failure is very low, then a quantitative decision procedure may be 
used to decide either to keep the engine on the wing for more five months and 
1,200 FH or to remove it for an SV. 
In the tables below a summary of the status and technical condition of the engine 
at time of the decision to be taken is presented. In the text that follows, the safety, 
technical and economic evaluation of the option to keep the engine installed to operate 







Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney 
Engine Serial Number NNNNNN 
Aircraft – Type Boeing 767-300 ER 
Registration CS-XXX 
Position Nr 2 
Hours (Time) Since New (HSN or TSN) 51104 
Cycles Since New (CSN) 10177 
Date of Last Shop Visit (DLCV) 
22JUN2005 
Shop SRT 
Hours Since Last Shop Visit (HSSV) 15598 
Cycles Since Last Shop Visit (CSSV) 3235 
Hour to Cycle Ratio Since Shop Visit 4:82 




Main Work Performed in the Last Shop Visit 
Component Work 
LPC 
 Repair;  
Fan ____ 
 Repair;  
HPC 
 Overhaul;  
DBS 
 Technical Performance Restoration;  
TNZ 
 Technical Performance Restoration;  
HPT 
 Overhaul;  
MGB 
 Repair. 









Cruise Delta EGT, ºC: 
42.6 18 
Cruise N1 Vibration: 
1.7 0.4  
Cruise N2 Vibration: 
0 0 
Take Off EGT Margin, ºC: 
10 37.4 




Oil Temperature, ºC: 
120 120 
Table 4 - ECM Parameters ESN 724616 - 15SEP2011 
 
 Physical Status / Defects found through borescope inspection 
i) HPT, 1st stage, 10 blades with coating missing 
Risk evaluation 
1) Safety risk: extremely remote 
2) Economic: Blade damage – 10 blades x $11,500 = $ 
115,000. 
ii) HPT, Seal with missing material 
Risk evaluation 
1) Safety risk: extremely remote; 
2) Economic: Fuel consumption increase; higher temperature 
in HPT, increase of core engine degradation. 
iii) HPT first stage Nozzle Guide Vanes (NGV), with missing 
coating 
Risk evaluation 
1) Safety: Extremely remote; 
2) Economic: Additional damage to NGV; no risk of 
unexpected failure. 
iv) HPT, NGV, 1st stage with cracks near cooling holes 
Technical Assessment 
The crack near two rear rows of cooling holes is within limits, 




maintenance programme. If the crack increases up to 13.005 mm forward 
of the two rear cooling holes, with a width not exceeding 40.0005 mm, 
the engine is still within limits, but a borescope inspection is required 
every 150 cycles. If the crack exceeds the above limits, the engine must 
be removed immediately or, under certain limits, within five cycles. 
Risk Analysis 
1) Safety: Within the interval of 250 cycles between 
borescope inspections the risk of failure is remote or extremely 
remote. 
2) Economic: i) In the next borescope inspection, the crack 
may be found to be outside the limits; this would disrupt the 
operation, based in a foreign country and continent, which was 
contracted by a valuable customer airline.  
This operation was planned to start within two months and 
last for three months. The average aircraft activity was planned for 
about 14 hours per day, leaving little time to accommodate an 
unscheduled engine removal anywhere in the American or the 
European continents, which would require the urgent placing of a 
replacement engine at high logistics costs. The risk of this occurrence 
was assessed as very low, since: 
i) By analytical methods, tests and field experience, 
manufacturers establish inspection intervals very 
conservatively, so that the probability of having a defect that 




ii) Taking this into account, if the crack increased at a 
higher than expected rate, crack characteristics most probably 
would then require inspections every 150 cycles (landings) 
instead of 250 cycles. 
Keeping the engine in operation would accelerate its deterioration and would 
increase SV cost; in particular it would increase HPT blades rates nozzle guide vanes 




engine SV cost increase was made and is presented below in Table 5. Later on this 
estimate was reviewed and higher amount was used in the Results section of this 
document 
 






 stage vanes 34 14,557 10 49,483 
HPT 2
nd
 stage vanes 21 23,525 0 0 
HPT 1
st
 stage blades 60 11,530 10 69,180 
HPT 2
nd
 stage blades 82 9,430 0 0 
Other    50,000 
Total (*)    168,674 
Table 5 - Preliminary estimate of the cost increase of the engine SV 
 The decision process about removing the engine in April/May or in September, 
after about 5 months and 1,200 hours of operation (most of it in wet lease/ACMI for a 
customer airline) was formally conducted as “an act of selecting a preferred course of 
action among alternatives” (Dilworth, 1992). 
The formal procedure for decision making took into account the required steps 
(Dilworth, 1992): 
- “Recognition of the need for a decision” – to remove the engine now or 
in September; 
- “Identification of objectives” – to achieve minimum engine 
maintenance cost per flight hour; 
- “Search for reasonable alternatives” – in the present case, the 
alternatives about the time to remove the engine for SV were well defined; 
- “Evaluation of alternatives” – the alternative events that could occur 
were evaluated, based on safety and economic risks; 
- “Select the best alternative” – it would be selected the alternative that, 
through the evaluation performed, would result in the minimum engine 




The decision making functions in three types of environments (Levin, Rubin, 
Stinson, & Gardner, Jr, 1989): 
i) Under conditions of certainty –only one event or state of nature 
exists, so there is absolute certainty about the future; 
ii) Under conditions of uncertainty – there is more than one 
possible event or state of nature, but the decision maker has no 
knowledge about them; 
iii) Under conditions of risk – as in ii) above, but the decision 
maker has the knowledge to assign probability values to the different 
states of nature. 
In the present environment, the decision is under conditions of risk, so it was 
considered as adequate to use a decision matrix/decision tree under the following 
conditions: 
i) The option to be selected would be the one in which the 
Expected Monetary Value (EMV) would result in the minimum 
estimated engine maintenance cost per flight hour; 
ii) The calculation of EMVs would consider: 
a. the engine conditional reliability to operate more 1,200 FH; 
b. the costs that would be incurred in case of different 
situations of engine failure, that could happen in flight or on the 
ground, resulting from pilots’ or maintenance reports or as result of 
findings outside limits that could be detected during the  mandatory 
borescope inspection that was planned to be done during the 
subsequent 5 months of operation; 
c. the estimated cost increase of the next SV as a result of 
keeping the engine in the aircraft operating more 1,200 FH; 
d. the discounted estimated cost value of the engine SV, as a 





The literature review, about the approach to optimising engine time on aircraft, 
provides a good overview of theories and computer applications on the subject. 
The questionnaire sent to engine experts and to relevant persons in the process of 
deciding when to remove an engine for an SV is a source of empirical data about actual 
practice in the industry. 
The case study, related to an engine that was operating in the critical decision 
time for removal (more than 15,000 FH and 3000 cycles since last shop visit (SLSV)), 
presents a valuable opportunity for an in depth qualitative analysis of an information-
rich case (Patton, 1990), since the condition of the engine may be evaluated as follows: 
iv) On the wing, in the beginning and until the end of the period of operation under 
study, the status of the engine is analysed through pilots’ and maintenance 
reports, borescope inspections, other maintenance checks and by the values of 
the engine condition monitoring parameters; 
v) In the shop, at the end of the period under study, after the disassembly of the 
engine, during the table inspection, the parts of the engine are fully available for 
visual inspection and non-destructive tests; 
vi) Comparisons of the engine’s technical condition in different moments provide 
valuable information about the deterioration of the engine during the period 
under evaluation.  
The analysis of the combination of the data collected, as referred to in this 
section, will provide a deep understanding of the methods to decide when to remove an 





Chapter 4   
4. RESULTS 
4.1. The Case Study – A Formal Process to Decide When to Remove an 
Engine for a Shop Visit 
4.1.1. The decision process. 
The decision maker has two options: 
D1: To remove the engine “now” (i.e., immediately after the decision) and send 
it for a shop visit (SV); 
D2: To remove the engine after five months from “now” and then it will operate 
on the aircraft more about 1,200 FH and 170 cycles (landings). 
Decision D1 has only one possible event or state of nature: 
E1: With probability p1 =1, the engine will go for a SV at an estimated cost 
of SVC0. 
Decision D2 will generate the following events: 
E21: With probability p21, the engine operates more five months and 1200 
FH without failure and then is removed and sent for a SV at the estimated 
cost and saving as follows: 
i) SVC5 = SVC0 + ΔSVC, is the cost of the SV to be performed five 
months and 1,200 FH later than in the case of decision D1; 
ii) ΔSVC is an estimated cost increase on SVC0 after 1,200 FH of 
operation; 
iii) DSVC0 is the  discounted cash flow saving over SVC0, since the SV 
will be performed five months later; 
E22: With probability p22, the engine fails in service after M months and T 
flight hours of operation; this event will generate two other possible events. 
E221: With conditional probability p221 = P(E221|E22) the engine failure 
occurs during a flight and the aircraft may have to divert to an alternative 




i) -SVCf the cost of the SV after failure in-flight and engine in flight 
shutdown (IFSD);  
ii) CDCf , contingency damage costs, to be included in SVCf, to cover 
the possibility of additional internal damage caused to the engine by  
the component that failed and originated the engine in-flight failure.  
iii) LCf  the logistics costs to replace an engine outside the base, maybe 
in an alternate (alternative) airport, due to an  in-flight failure and 
IFSD; 
i) CLf the loss of contribution (revenue – variable costs) during the 
period of AOG due to in-flight engine failure; 
ii) DSVCf is the discounted cash flow saving over SVC0, since the SV 
will be performed M months later than in case of decision D1. 
E222: With conditional probability p222, = P(E222|E22), the engine failure 
occurs on the ground, the engine is replaced and is sent for a SV, so the 
operating airline will incur the following costs: 
i) SVCg the cost of the SV after the failure on the ground; 
ii) LCg, the logistics costs to replace an engine outside the base due to 
in service failure; 
iii) CLg  the loss of contribution (revenue – variable costs) during the 
period of AOG due to the engine failure on the ground; 
iv) DSVCg is the discounted cash flow saving over SVC0, since the SV 
will be performed M months later than in case of decision D1. 
4.1.2. Numbers Used in the Baseline Scenario of the Decision 
Matrix/Tree 
a) Event E1 – The engine is sent for an SV “now”: 
SVC0 = $3,000,000; despite being selected in accordance with the airline 
experience and the technical condition of the engine, this amount is 
essentially a cost baseline to compare the two options for the time to remove 
the engine for an SV. In this scenario the engine would be removed after 





b) Event E21 – The engine will be removed after five months from now and will run 
in the aircraft more 1,200 FH. 
SVC5 =  SVC0 + ΔSVC = $3,000,000 + $168,674 x 1.3 = $3,219,276 ,  
where ΔSVC is the estimated SV cost increase caused by more than 1,200 
FH of engine operation; based on the airline expert’s opinion, it was decided 
to use the amount estimated in Chapter 2 augmented by 30%. 
DSVC0 = SVC0 – SVC0 / (1+i (5/12)) = $3,000,000 - $2,920,892 = $79,108 
where i = 6.5% is the assumed discount rate per year. 
p21 = 1- p22 = 1 – 0.03024 = 0.9698, where p22 is the probability of engine 
failure, determined below. 
c) Event E22 
p22 =    
     = 0.026 x 1.2 e^-0.026 x1.2 = 0.03024 
assuming, as acceptable for the decision process, that the engine failure rate 
is constant during the additional period of operation, so we have a Poisson 
process, where 
 λ = 0.026 is the basic unscheduled removal rate per 1,000 FH, reported in 
the Pratt and Whitney PW4000 Service Information Report (2009) 
t = 1.2 thousand FH, the additional time of operation 
e = 2.71828… is the neperian number. 
d) Event E221 
p221 = IFSD rate x 1.2 e
-IFSD rate x 1.2




Assuming a constant IFSD rate during the additional period of operation and  
using the IFSD rate reported in the Pratt and Whitney PW4000 Service 
Information Report (2009). 
SVCf = SVC0 + T/1200 x ΔSVC + CDCf = $3,000,000 + 600 FH/1200 FH x 
$168,674 x 1.3 + $500,000 = $3,609,638 
DSVCf = M/5 x dSVC0 = 2.5/5 x $79,108 = $39,554 
LCf = $250,000 
CLf = 7 days x 14 FH x $3,800 = $ 372,400 
Using the criterion of rationality – “all states of nature are assumed equally 




the middle of the planned period of operation (i.e. after M=2.5 months and 
600 FH of operation). 
From the expert opinion of the airline staff, CDCf was assumed to be 
$500,000, as a robust figure. 
Taking into account past experience and the routes to be operated, the LCf 
cost was estimated at $250,000 for transportation of the removed and 
installed engines and for contracting a team with the necessary equipment to 
replace the engine, eventually in an alternate airport, where the aircraft had 
been forced to land.  
The contribution loss CLf was estimated on the assumption of seven days 
AOG to replace the engine. The operating airline would have an average 
daily contribution loss of 14 hours per day multiplied by $3800/FH, which is 
difference between the ACMI price per BH and the variable cost per BH, 
that in this case (aircraft wet lease) is just the aircraft maintenance variable 
cost. 
e) Event E22 
p222 = 1 – P221 = 1 – 0.1972 = 0.8028. 
SVCg = SVC0 + T/1200 x ΔSVC = $3,000,000 + 600 FH/1200 FH x 
$168,674 x 1.3 = $3,109,638 
DSVCg = M/5 x dSVC0 = 2.5/5 x $79,108 = $39,554 
LCg = $100,000 
If the engine failure would occur or be detected on the ground, the engine 
change would be done in one of the airports of the planned operation, so it 
was estimated, based on the airline experience, that the logistics cost LCg 
would not exceed $100,000. 
CLg = 5 days x 14 FH x $3,800 = $266,000 
For the engine failure on the ground it was estimated five days AOG to 
replace the engine. 
The safety assessment and the technical evaluation of the engine condition, as 
described in the previous chapter, did not conclude that the engine could not be 
operating for more 1,200 FH and 170 cycles. So the decision, about removing the 




the economic evaluation, which was done using a decision tree/decision matrix, as 
presented below. 
The best decision is the one that results in the minimum expected unit cost, i.e. 
the minimum expected engine maintenance cost per flight hour. 
In Figure 5, two decision branches are presented in the decision tree: i) branch 
D1: remove now; ii) branch D2: remove after five months. The expected values are 
calculated at each node from right to left, multiplying the total cost of each event by the 
probability of the event and dividing by the FH operated by the engine. The calculations 
are described in the decision matrix. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Decision Tree for time to remove the engine for an SV 
In the following pages four decision matrixes are presented, including the 
baseline scenario and tree simulations for sensitivity analysis. 
In Table 6 below is presented the most likely scenario of estimated costs to 
replace the engine, in case of engine failure in-flight or on-ground during the five 
months of operation. This is the Baseline Scenario, which uses the values of costs, flight 
hours and probabilities that are described above. 
In Table 7 a more pessimistic scenario is evaluated, assuming much higher costs 
to replace the engine in the case of failure during the planned period of operation – LCf 




Another sensitivity analysis was performed by increasing the probability of 
engine failure; this simulation was performed to deal with the controversial assumption 
of the constant engine failure rate during the additional period of operation. The 
conclusions are presented as follows: 
- In Table 8, using the Baseline Scenario, it was necessary to multiply by 7,24 
the probability of engine failure p22 to obtain a break-even point, where the expected 
values are equal for both decision options, D1 = Remove Now or D2 = Remove After 
Five Months. 
- In Table 9, using the Pessimistic Scenario, the break-even point was found by 
multiplying p22 by 5.76. 
Taking into account the sensitivity analysis that was performed, the decision to 





















$3,436,084 p222 0.8028 15,704 $2,758,435 $175.65
$3,585,258 $228.30
E22 - In 
Service 
failure
$3,585,258 p22 0.030242 15,704 $108,424 $6.90
SVC5 $3,219,276 16,304
DSVC -$79,108
$3,140,168 p21 0.9698 16,304 $3,045,204 $186.78
$3,153,628 $193.68




E21 - No 
failure





























































































$3,536,084 p222 0.802785 15,704 $2,838,714 $180.76
$3,714,840 $236.55
E22 - In 
Service 
failure
$3,714,840 p22 0.030242 15,704 $112,343 $7.15
SVC5 $3,219,276 16,304
DSVC -$79,108
$3,140,168 p21 0.969758 16,304 $3,045,204 $186.78
$3,157,547 $193.93



































































































$3,436,084 p222 0.97276 15,704 $3,342,486 $212.84
$3,456,688 $220.12
E22 - In 
Service 
failure
$3,456,688 p22 0.218949 15,704 $756,839 $48.19
SVC5 $3,219,276 16,304
DSVC -$79,108
$3,140,168 p21 0.78 16,304 $2,452,631 $150.43
$3,209,470 $198.63













































































Table 8 - Decision matrix for the time to remove the engine - Baseline Scenario 





















$3,536,084 p222 0.965761 15,704 $3,415,013 $217.46
$3,567,118 $227.15
E22 - In 
Service 
failure
$3,567,118 p22 0.174192 15,704 $621,362 $39.57
SVC5 $3,219,276 16,304
DSVC -$79,108
$3,140,168 p21 0.825808 16,304 $2,593,177 $159.05
$3,214,539 $198.62












































































Table 9 - Decision matrix for the time to remove the engine - Pessimistic 





4.1.3. The Decision 
Taking into account that the safety assessment and the technical evaluation of 
the engine condition did not conclude with any constrains on keeping the engine in 
operation for more 1,200 FH, subject to the prescribed maintenance tasks, including the 
periodic borescope inspections, the decision was based only on the economical 
appraisal. 
Based on the results of the decision tree evaluation, including the sensitivity 
analysis about increasing the probability of engine failure, it was decided to keep the 
engine installed in the aircraft for an additional five months to operate more 1,200 FH; 
besides the expected reduction on the unit maintenance costs a good incentive was the 
perspective of delaying for five months an expense in excess of $3 million. 
4.1.4. The Engine Behaviour 
During the five months of ACMI operation for the contracting airline (the 
Lessee or carrier airline), with the aircraft based in a foreign country airport, there were 
several technical problems that did cause delays and, in a few cases, complaints from 
the customer/contracting airline. None of the technical problems and complaints were 
related to the engine object of this case study; as a matter of fact, some technical 
problems were related with the other (low time) engine of the aircraft.  
The engine performed as expected, passed the planned borescope inspection and, 
except for the pilots’ reports about the operational parameters and the overall 
performance, mainly during start and climb, nothing relevant happened with the engine 
during the five months period of operation, in which more than 1,200 FH were 
accumulated. 
A spread sheet that was prepared for comparing the ECM parameters at the 
beginning and at the end of the 5 months operation showed some increase in the 
degradation rate of the ECM parameters; this increase of the degradation rate was even 
more evident when comparing with the ECM parameters of the other engine installed in 
the same aircraft. 
In the decision process to decide when to remove the engine for SV, the fuel 
consumption was not taken into consideration, because in the ACMI business the 




responsibility of the carrier airline (the wet Lessee), which is also responsible for the 
other variable cost, except maintenance. 
In the study that was performed it was evaluated the effect on fuel consumption 
of an engine with high time of operation since last performance restoration SV. The 
results are illustrated in Figure 6, below, where are represented the fuel consumption of  
the aircraft with the engine that are being evaluated in this document (Target Aircraft) 
and another aircraft (Other Aircraft) equipped with low time engines that did performed 
at the same time very similar routes. 
The aircraft with high time engines (Target Aircraft) had an average fuel 
consumption of 5,514 Kg/FH, 2.7% higher than the Other Aircraft that had a fuel 
consumption of 5,371 Kg/FH. It was estimated that the high time engine had fuel 
consumption in excess of 5% more than the other engines.  
Taking into account that in 2011 the price of the aviation jet fuel, in most of the 
airports of the world is higher than $1 per Kg (in Lisbon is about $1.15 per Kg), it 
becomes evident that the fuel consumption may not be taken a priori as negligible in a 
decision process to remove an engine for SV, if the overall ownership costs are under 
consideration.  
 








































































Fuel Consumption KG / FH 




At the end of the ACMI contract, the engine was removed and sent for a shop 
visit (SV) in the MRO that was selected, from a final pre-selection of four, in a 
worldwide competition between companies in America, Asia and Europe. 
ENGINE DETERIORATION 
The progress of the physical status of certain critical areas of the engine, in the 
so called hot section (combustion chambers and turbines) was observed, by comparing 
selected images from the films of the engine borescope inspections performed in 
different occasions. The evaluation and understanding of the deterioration process is 
interesting, especially in this case of an engine with high time since last refurbishment 
in a SV. 
As examples of the engine deterioration, the images that are presented here were 
selected from borescope inspections performed on the engine under study on the 
following dates: 
a) 03SEP2010 -  the engine accumulated TSN (Time Since New) = 49,680 flight 
hours, CSN (Cycles Since New) = 9825; 
b) 28DEC2010 -  TSN = 50,522 flight hours; CSN = 10,069 cycles; 
c) 30SEPG2011 – TSN = 52,091; CSN 10316. 
In Figure 7 it is shown in the combustion chamber the increase of burn spots and 
the growth of cracks, between 03SEP2010 and 30SEP2011; the image on the right 
shows the combustion chamber after the disassembly of the engine in the SV. 
 




In Figure 8 it is shown the deterioration progress of a first stage blade of the 
HPT (a T1 blade), between 28DEC2010 and 30AUG2011; in the left side it is presented 
the blade that was disassembled in the SV. The ceramic coating of the T1 blade shows 
the deterioration resulting from high time in operation, exposing, in some areas, the 
parent material directly to hot gas, which increases the blade degradation rate. The T1 
blade shown in the picture, which costs about $14,500, passed the preliminary 
inspection in the SV, so likely it will be repaired and installed again in the engine. 
 
Figure 8 - Deterioration progress in a first stage blade of the HPT 
 
In Figure 8 is shown the deterioration progress in a first stage nose guide vane 
(NGV) of HPT. It is evident the deterioration of the ceramic coating, there are areas of 
spalled surface material and it is evident the crack growth between the two borescope 
inspections. This NGV is the one that was under watch, as mentioned in the last chapter. 
 




THE SHOP VISIT 
In the shop the engine modules were separated, disassembled and a so-called 
table inspection was performed, where a detailed inspection of all the parts was made. 
The inspection revealed the normal wear and tear of an engine that had been in 
operation for more than 16,000 FH and about 3500 cycles since its last performance 
restoration SV, but nothing abnormal was found. 
The HPT’s first stage NGV that was a matter of special concern was confirmed 
to be still within limits, as per the last borescope inspection, and, despite its nasty aspect 
(Figure 10), it was not classified as scrap, so it was sent for repair and will be installed 
on the engine again. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Table Inspection´s photograph of the damaged HPT´s first stage NGV that was under 
surveillance 
The final cost of the SV was not available at the time of the preparation of this 




assumptions about the cost increase of the SV, resulting from keeping the engine in 
operation for more approximately 1,200 FH, will be higher than estimated. 
Taking the Baseline Scenario as a reference, if the decision taken in this case 
were to be repeated several times, it would result in an average saving of about US$5 
per FH, i.e $80,000 per 16,000 FH of engine run. 
In the present case, since no engine failure ocurred, the estimated total cost of 
the selected option is $3,140,168 for 16,304 FH resulting in a saving of $6/FH and a 
total saving of $98,179. 
4.2. Results of the Questionnaire about the Decision Process to Remove an 
Engine for Shop Visit 
As referred to in chapter 3, it was prepared an on-line questionnaire about the 
procedures and criteria used by airlines to decide the best time to remove an engine for 
SV. Engine experts and relevant people for the decision process of airlines, MROs and 
OEMs were invited to answer the questionnaire.  
At the preparation of this document it was collected 18 answers from engine 
experts, working for relevant organizations in relation to this study. Despite the small 
size of the sample that is being analysed, Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the variety in 
size and activity of the organizations that did provide answers and the technical 
expertise and functional relevance of their staff that did participate: 
- Airlines, MROs and OEM; 
- Directors, managers and other engine specialists, with high expertise in engine 
maintenance; about 90% the engineers that did answer the questionnaire 





Figure 11 - Activity of the companies that did answer the questionnaire 
 
Figure 12  - Functions of the engine experts that did answer the questionnaire 
The questionnaire was answered by high and medium rank engine experts from 
small, medium and large organizations. 
Since the sample is small and was essentially obtained by convenience, the 
results cannot be generalized to all airlines, because there is no guarantee that it 
represents the universe (Hill & Hill, 2008, p. 50). Despite that weakness, the data and 
information that was collected is information rich and relevant, taking into account the 
variety and the expertise of the sources. 
The questionnaire was analysed by selecting the relevant answers to understand 
the decision process to remove an engine for SV, when still operating within 
manufacturer defined limits, and to evaluate if and how the minimum engine 






























The questionnaire was prepared with 3 categories of questions and the answers 
were classified by the importance given by the engine experts to the related factors or 
dimensions of each category.  
In Table 10 herein below are presented the main conclusions of the 
questionnaire, organized as follows: 
a) In the first column it is described the key question, about the decision 
process to remove an engine for SV: 
i. Who Takes the Decision – who and/or in what departments are 
the decision taken; 
ii. Decision Objective Factors – what concerns and objectives are 
addressed to decide when to remove the engine for SV; 
iii. Decision Methods, Procedures and Tools – what are the 
procedures, analytic methods and computer or manual tools that 
are used in the decision process. 
b) In the second column are the 3 or 4 factors that got the highest scores from 
the engine experts; 
c) In the third column are listed the factors that did get low scores from the 
answers of the engine experts, but, a priori, appear to be important in the decision 
process to minimize engine maintenance cost per flight hour or to optimize the 






PARTICIPATION Strong Participation Low or Null Participation 
Who Takes the Decision 
1
rst 
Power Plant Engineer 
2
nd
 Engineering Manager 
3
rd




       
 









 - Maximize Safety 
3
rd






 Minimize Fuel Cost 
 
Note: Fuel consumption is not part of 
maintenance cost, but it is strongly 
correlated with maintenance 
practises (see Figure 6). 
     
Table 10 - Summary of the results of the questionnaire to engine experts 
 
In addition to the score given by the engine experts to the closed questions, some 
of the participants added relevant comments about the decision process to remove an 
engine for SV. A summary of the most important comments are presented below. 
A well-qualified engine expert from a big organization states clearly that in their 
decision process to remove an engine for SV they do not aim at minimum maintenance 
cost per FH. They have a target for engine run time, which is high compared with the 
industry average,  and they keep the engine on the wing as long as possible, sometimes 
Weight High & Very High Low 
Decision Methods, 














 Descriptive rules 
 MRO expert opinion 
 Reliability models 




well above that target. The main drivers to remove the engine are: i) the results of the 
borescope inspections; ii) ECM trend monitoring; iii) reliability; iv) spares availability 
and v) financial and budgeting constrains. They use professional reliability procedures 
to assist on the decision process. 
Another expert opinion does not state that they have not as an objective to 
minimize engine maintenance unit cost, but considers relevant the same engine removal 
drivers, as above; he includes an additional removal driver, the availability of slots in a 
suitable engine maintenance shop. 
One expert mentions the importance of staggering the engines of the airline fleet, 
i. e. the need for planning the operation and the SVs to avoid the risk of having several 
SVs at same time, which could result in financial difficulties for the airline and shortage 
of replacement engines. 
 
4.3. Results Consolidation 
The case study, the questionnaire send to engine experts and the research that 
was done on the data of past SV provided valuable information for the understanding 
and improvement of the decision process to remove an engine for SV. 
The case study provided a live situation, a specific information-rich extreme 
case, because the engine was operating in the critical interval of high time since last SV, 
with defects under watch and performing a very sensitive commercial operation. The 
decision process, the commercial operation, the degradation of the ECM parameters, the 
observation of engine parts deterioration and the comparison of fuel consumption on 
similar aircraft, all provided relevant information to this project. 
The extensive research that was done on the files of past engine SV provided 
useful information about damage findings, material deterioration, SV costs and areas for 
improvement in On-Aircraft maintenance. The subject is complex, because it involves 
many variables, like engine type of operation, workscope of previous SVs, type of 
repairs and material used in previous SV and detailed information of the ECM 
parameters and borescope inspections at the time when the engines were removed. More 
research on the subject is required to assess past decisions about the time that chosen to 
remove the engine for SV. Despite that fact valuable information was collected for this 




The answers from engine experts to the questionnaire provide information about 
the air transport industry approach to optimizing engine time on-wing. The opinion and 
the practices converge in some key factors, but there are also strong differences. About 
engine time on-wing there is a fundamental difference between two big organizations: i) 
one aims at keeping the engine on-wing as long as possible; ii) another organization 
removes the engine at first signs engine degradation that would increase fuel 
consumption and the cost of the SV. 
The results of the case study, the questionnaire and the study of past shop visits 








5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Conclusions 
In the case study the decision maker used a certain number of key factors to 
select the better of the two options about when to remove the engine for SV. 
In the answers to the questionnaire about the best time to remove an engine for 
SV, the engine experts expressed their opinion essentially about the same factors. 
In the Table 11 is presented a combination of the results of the case study and 
the questionnaire.  Selected factors are classified as High (H) or Low (L) as per their 
importance in the case study (CST) and in the answers to the questionnaire (QUE). 
Key Questions Entities/Factors CST QUE Combination 
Who Takes the 
Decision? 
Corporate Management H L H/L 
Power Plant Engineer H H H 
Engineering Manager H H H 




Avoid IFSD H H H 
Maximize Safety L H L/H 
Time On-Wing H H H 
Minimize Engine Maintenance Unit Cost H H/L HH/L 
Avoid Unscheduled Removal H L H/L 
Minimize Fuel Cost L L L 
Financial /Budget constraints H H/L HH/L 
Spare Engine Availability H/L H/L H/L 





Borescope Inspection H H H 
ECM/EHM qualitative evaluation H H H 
ECM/EHM quantitative evaluation H H H 
Descriptive rules/procedures H H/L HH/L 
Reliability Calculation (professional) H L H/L 
Decision Tree/Op. Research procedures H L H/L 
Computer Decision Model  L L L 
MRO expert opinion L L L 
Manufacturer expert opinion H L H/L 
    




In the Table 11 a summary of the main conclusions of the study that is presented 
in this document. Instead of L or H, some factors were classified as L/H or H/L in the 
columns “CST” or “QUE”, to state that the importance of the factor is not well defined 
or is somewhere between L and H. In the “Combination” column is presented the 
combined result of “CST” and “QUE”. 
The decisions about when to remove an engine for SV is normally taken in the 
engineering department, involving very specialised staff like power plant engineers, 
reliability engineers and the engineering manager. In airlines that have engine shops it is 
common that the management of the engine shop participates in the decision process. 
Despite the fact that an engine SV is very expensive, Finance Directors and senior 
corporate managers do not participate in the decision process. 
Avoid IFSD, maximize safety and maximize time on-wing are the main 
objectives in the process to decide when to remove an engine for SV. In particular 
maximize time on-wing looks to be a preferred option of the engineers responsible for 
engine management, probably due to the following reasons: i) postpones the high 
expenses of a SV; ii) engine expert may believe that more time on-wing reduces 
maintenance costs. 
In the case study safety was evaluated but was not considered a critical factor, 
because it was assumed that safety is assured by the strict compliance with the 
maintenance and operational procedures. 
Despite some positive answers, the combination of the answers to different 
questions leads to the conclusion that, in most of the cases, to minimize the engine 
maintenance unit cost is not an explicit objective or a factor that is included in the 
procedure to decide engine time on-wing. There is more concern with financial and 
budget constraints. 
The engine experts consider that the most important source of information to 
decide when to remove an engine for shop visit comes from the findings of the 
borescope inspection. This is clearly concluded from the answers to the questionnaire 
and it was also the main concern during the critical period of operation of the engine of 
the case study. 
The answers to the questionnaire revealed that only a small percentage of the 




analytic or computer decision tool to manage engine time on-wing; it is rare also the use 
of the statistic inference or prediction theory. 
In the opinion of the engine experts that did answer the questionnaire, it would 
be desirable to use decision tree or other operation research techniques or models in the 
decision process for optimisation of engine time on-wing. 
5.2. Recommendations 
To decide when to remove an engine for SV is relevant for cost management and 
for the financial planning of the airlines because the expenses of a SV may vary from $1 
to $10 million. 
Based on the results of the research that was done in this project, some 
recommendations are presented below. 
5.2.1. The recommended methodology to decide when to remove 
an engine for SV 
1. For each engine organize and maintain a comprehensive  data base that, 
besides the usual data of dates, hours, cycles, maintenance events, etc. 
would include: 
a. Historic information 
- Workscope of the past SVs;  
- ECM parameters before the past SVs;  
- Borescope images before the last SVs – relevant dated 
images with findings, deterioration progress; 
- Work performed in the past SVs including parts 
replacement history – new parts, repaired parts, types 
and numbers of repairs done in the past; number of 
repairs subsequent allowed repairs. 




-  systematic records of select images of the borescope 
inspections to monitor the material deterioration process 
in the critical areas of the engine;  
- periodic records of the rate of variation of the ECM 
parameters; 
-  systematic records of images of engine items on watch, 
by borescope inspections or other inspections. 
c. Establish a target of engine FH and cycles on wing 
d.  After engine installation on the aircraft do a forecast the cost of 
the next SV cost and SV cost/FH, based on the historic 
information of the fleet and of the specific engine 
e. Monitor the estimates in c) and d) against the engine behaviour, 
status and technical condition that are monitored with the 
information in the data base. 
f. Use a statistic model to predict engine reliability based on: i) the 
industry reliability information provided by the engine 
manufacturer; ii) airline engine reliability experience; iii) specific 
engine technical status and condition, based on visual and 
borescope inspections, ECM parameters, LLPs, ADs.  
The Bayesian reliability theory, using the Weibull as one of the 
distribution may be appropriate for this purpose – additional 
research is required to assess the effectiveness of this approach. 
g. Combine or compare the results of reliability prediction with the 
target FH and cycles to evaluate regularly possible deviations and 
the impact on the estimated SV costs. 
h. To decide when to remove an engine for shop visit use a 
quantitative model like a decision tree, to take the appropriate 




5.2.2. The Decision Process 
The high cost of SVs justifies that senior staff with corporate financial 
responsibilities participate in the decision process - even not being engine experts, they 
may provide important inputs related with the time value of the money and its 
availability. 
 The fuel cost should be considered as a factor to decide when to remove an 
engine for SV – its weight in the decision will depends on the circumstances. 
5.2.3. Additional research  
It is recommend additional research in the following areas: 
 Research on the data of ECM parameters and on the other aircraft flight data 
monitoring data to improve predictive capability of defects and engine failures. 
 Test the viability and evaluate the effectiveness of Bayesian statistics to predict 
engine reliability, with inputs airline own experience, specific engine condition and 
manufacturer general reliability data. The research should consider the individual 
reliability of the main modules of the engine. 
 Research on the progress of the deterioration of the most expensive engine 
parts, as a function of calendar age, FH, cycles, operational environment, derating, work 
performed in past SVs, (including the condition of the repaired material installed) etc., 
to improve reliability prediction and the forecast of SV costs. 
 Development of a computer based decision tool, using intelligent agents or 
other methods of artificial intelligence, including the results of the research and the 
recommended methodology described here above, to assist on the decisions to optimize 
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